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Abstract 
Since 2001, various Western countries have accorded legal recognition to same-sex 
marriages, but thus far we lack information on how this legislation is related to trends in 
public opinion. In most of the literature, declining levels of prejudice toward homosexuality 
are found to result from structural social processes (rising education, secularization, 
detraditionalisation), which should occur in all industrialized societies, with or without same-
sex marriage. In this article, we analyse data of the five waves of the European Social Survey 
for the period 2002-2010. Results show that levels of prejudice are significantly lower in 
countries that recognize same-sex marriage, while levels are only slightly lower in countries 
with some form of registered partnership for gay and lesbian couples. Therefore, we can 
assume that same-sex marriage is indeed an issue affecting public opinion and public policy. 
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S U M M A R Y 
Introduction 
The legal recognition of same-sex marriage has been hotly debated in numerous Western 
societies (Sherkat, Powell-Williams, Maddox, & de Vries, 2011; Pettinicchio, 2012). While in 
some countries legislation was passed quite early and without too much political debate 
(Eeckhout & Paternotte, 2011), in other countries legal and political arguments have dragged 
on for a longer period of time (Gerstmann, 2008; McVeigh & Diaz, 2009). Since the start of 
the 21
st
 century various countries in Western Europe and countries like Canada, Argentina, 
and South Africa have introduced legislation on same-sex marriage (Chamie & Mirkin, 2011). 
Recently, same-sex marriage legislation was also adopted by France, Uruguay and New 
Zealand. We know less, however, about what this diffusion process implies for broader 
patterns of social change with regard to homosexuality. The most straightforward assumption 
could be that same-sex marriage legislation is successfully implemented mostly in countries 
with a very liberal or tolerant public opinion. This claim, however, is not always supported by 
the available data. In the United States, it has been shown that population attitudes toward 
same-sex marriage have changed in a more liberal direction during the period 1988-2010  
(Baunach, 2012), but there is not yet a clear policy solution. Other authors assign a more 
important role to political veto players, like Conservative or religious parties that are able to 
block any legislation in this area (Jaspers, Lubbers, & de Graaf, 2007). While we know that 
religion has a strong effect on attitudes toward homosexuality (Herek, 1987), it is striking to 
note that the legal adoption of same-sex marriage by parliament has occurred both in 
traditionally Protestant but highly secularized countries like Sweden (in 2009), as in 
traditionally Catholic countries like Portugal (in 2010). It is clear, therefore, that this kind of 
general religious divisions do not help us to explain the occurrence of same-sex marriage 
legislation. 
Currently, there is no systematic analysis of the relation between public attitudes toward 
homosexuality and the legal recognition of same-sex marriage and registered partnership. 
From the point of agenda setting-studies and responsive government theory, it could be 
expected that liberal public opinion and media have an agenda-setting function and that 
subsequently the topic is placed on the political agenda (Hester & Gibson, 2007). Other 
authors have argued that the causal relation might go the other way around, as it is expected 
that individuals in countries where same-sex marriage or some form of registered partnership 
is adopted, will gradually develop a more tolerant attitude toward homosexuality (Badgett, 
2009). 
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In this article, our goal is to assess whether there is a clear relation between public attitudes 
toward homosexuality and the recognition of same-sex marriage or non-marital forms of legal 
recognition. This research question is theoretically relevant as it allows us to investigate 
whether and how levels of prejudice can have an effect on government policy. It is also 
socially relevant as it allows us to gain a better understanding of the forces advocating or 
opposing the recognition of same-sex marriage. Preliminary research suggests that same-sex 
marriage legislation can have some public health benefits (Buffie, 2011; Hatzenbuehler, 
O’Cleirigh, Grasso, Mayer, Safren, & Bradford, 2012), but it can be observed that this kind of 
considerations hardly play a role in the public and political debate. Therefore, it is relevant to 
systematically compare public opinion data with government policy in order to understand 
what kind of forces do shape the debate on the recognition of same-sex marriage in practice. 
 
Before we present the data and methods, we will first briefly review the literature on the 
determinants of (the trend in) prejudice toward homosexuality. We will focus on the trends in 
prejudice in Europe between 2002 and 2010, not only because most countries that have 
introduced same-sex marriage in this period are European, but also because high-quality 
comparative public opinion data on European countries are available for this period. 
Subsequently, we construct a multilevel pooled time series cross-section model, accounting 
for both individual and society level determinants of trends in prejudice toward 
homosexuality. 
 
(…) 
 
 
Data and Methods 
 
Data 
To analyse the relation between same-sex marriage recognition and the level of prejudice 
toward homosexuality, we use data from the European Social Survey (ESS 2002-2010). The 
ESS is a high-quality cross-sectional repeated survey conducted five times between 2002 and 
2010. Individuals in more than 30 countries geographically located in Europe and Israel were 
questioned about their opinions, attitudes and demographics. At every wave new individuals 
aged 15 and over were contacted for participation in a one hour-long face-to-face interview. 
The ESS is especially designed to capture attitudinal change in Europe over time. In each 
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participating country samples were drawn using a multi-stage sampling design: administrative 
units were selected proportional to size, within these units households were randomly 
selected, and subsequently individuals within households.  
In this article, we only included respondents from countries that participated in at least two 
of the five waves (as a result Romania, Iceland and Latvia were excluded). Because of the 
significant cultural differences, respondents from Turkey and Israel too were left out of the 
pooled data file (Takács & Szalma, 2011).
1
 Finally, we split the German sample in ‘East-
Germany’ and ‘West-Germany’ because we included a country-level control variable 
measuring the number of stable democracy years since 1919 (infra) and this variable 
obviously takes a different value in both parts of that country. Eventually, 224,241 
respondents nested in 29 countries were included in the analyses.
2
 Several sample designs 
used by the participating countries were not able to give all individuals in the population 
exactly the same probability of selection. Therefore, a design weight was applied for all 
analyses in line with the recommendations of the ESS data team (Ganninger, 2007). 
 
Measurement 
The dependent variable in this article, disapproval of homosexuality, is measured by asking 
respondents to evaluate the following statement: ‘gay men and lesbians should be free to live 
their own life as they wish’ (1=Strongly agree; 5=Strongly disagree). This items is part of the 
core module of the ESS and asked in every wave in all participating countries. It has to be 
acknowledged that measuring disapproval of homosexuality with only one item is not an 
optimal solution from a methodological point of view. However, the item is comparable over 
time in five subsequent waves of this survey and from previous research we know that 
prejudice toward homosexuality is predominantly one-dimensional (Hooghe & Meeusen, 
2012). As such, we can assume that this single item at least provides a valid indication about 
the level of disapproval of homosexuality. 
Figure 1 illustrates the average trend in disapproval of homosexuality within the countries 
that participated in all five waves of the ESS. We limit the figure to countries with five 
measurement points because otherwise fluctuations might occur as countries step in and out of 
the ESS sample. Disapproval rates are stable between 2002 and 2006 and significantly 
decrease in 2008 and 2010. Taking into account the different selection probabilities (design 
weight) and the different population sizes (population size weight) the mean score on 
disapproval of homosexuality for the whole sample between 2002 and 2010 is estimated as 
1.90, which indicates that the attitude toward homosexuality it relatively positive. For the 
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countries that participated in all five waves of the ESS the correlation between survey wave 
and average score on disapproval is -.07  (p<.001), which implies that there is a general and 
significant decrease in prejudice toward homosexuality in those countries.
3
  
 
[Figure 1 around here] 
 
Individual-level demographic variables were included to control for the possibility that a 
changing composition of the European society might influence the trend in disapproval of 
homosexuality (Hooghe, 2012; Jaspers et al., 2007). We controlled for gender (0=Male; 
1=Female), marital status (1=Married/Cohabiting; 2=Previously married, now 
divorced/widowed; 3=Never married), education, age, religious denomination, religiousness, 
and religious practice. Education was measured by asking respondents about their highest 
educational achievement. We distinguished five different education levels: primary education, 
lower secondary education, upper secondary education, post-secondary non-tertiary 
education, tertiary education. Age was measured in years staring from 15 to 100. Respondents 
aged below 15 or above 101 were judged to be outliers and excluded from the dataset. With 
regard to religious denomination, respondents were categorized in following groups: Roman 
Catholic, Protestant, Eastern Orthodox, Muslim, Other (Jewish, other Christian 
denominations, Eastern religions, other non-Christian denominations) and non-religious. To 
measure religious practice, respondents were asked how frequently they attend religious 
services (1=Never; 7=Every day). Religiousness, finally, was operationalized with the 
question ‘how religious are you’, which respondents had to evaluate on a 10-point scale 
(0=Not at all religious; 10=Very religious). Appendix 1 provides descriptive statistics for all 
individual-level data. 
We expect all these individual-level variables to have a significant impact on the level of 
tolerance toward homosexuality. More precisely, we expect female, younger and higher 
educated respondents to be more tolerant than male, older and lower educated respondents 
(Treas, 2002). Also, people (more frequently) exposed to traditional socializing agents as 
religion, are expected to be more disapproving of homosexuality (Gerhards, 2010; Van de 
Meerendonk & Scheepers, 2004). With regard to marital status, unmarried persons tend to be 
more homophobic than married people (Hooghe & Meeusen, 2012; Kunkel & Temple, 1992). 
 
The main independent variable of interest is the level of same-sex partnership recognition. 
We divided the countries in three categories depending on the partnership rights offered to the 
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LGBT community: (1) countries without same-sex marriage legislation, (2) countries with 
some form of registered partnership but not a formal recognition of marriage and (3) countries 
where same-sex marriage is legally possible and has exactly the same rights as all forms of 
marriage. The difference between the final two categories is that in registered partnership 
some rights are assigned to partners in that relation, while the introduction of same-sex 
marriage automatically implies that all married couples receive exactly the same set of rights 
and obligations, no matter what their gender composition might be. Only with regard to 
parenthood and children and adoption procedures, legal differences between different-sex and 
same-sex couples still exist. The classification of the countries was based on the information 
provided by Takács and Szalma (2011) and on documentation reports of the International 
LGBT and intersex association (ILGA, 2012). Previous studies by Takács and Szalma (2011) 
and van den Akker et al. (2013) have indicated that the adoption of same-sex marriage 
legislation is indeed positively related to tolerance.  
Country-level controls included in the model were GDP per capita, democratic stability 
and the traditionally dominant religion in a country. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per 
capita was calculated as the average GDP between 2000-2010 based on data from the United 
Nations economic commission for Europe (UNECE, 2012). GDP per capita is measured in 
international comparable prices by expenditure at 1,000 US$ of 2005. The democratic 
stability of a country was operationalized by counting the number of years that a country has 
had a stable democracy since 1919 until 2011 (Polity IV, 2011). Countries as Switzerland, UK 
and Sweden have a stable democracy since 1919, while countries as Russia, Slovenia and 
Ukraine only know a stable democracy for 20 years. To define the dominant religious 
tradition of the participating countries, we used the classification of Andersen and Fetner 
(2008): Roman Catholic, Mixed Christian, Protestant and Eastern Orthodox. In Appendix 1 
more details about the distribution of the variables are provided. 
With regard to the country-level control variables we expect countries with greater 
economic security (higher GDP per capita) and a longer democratic tradition to be more 
tolerant toward homosexuality (Andersen & Fetner, 2008; Gerhards, 2010). It has to be noted 
that there is no information available on the strenght or the strategy of LGBT movements 
themselves in all these countries. A direct test of the thesis that a strong, active and highly 
visible LGBT movement has a direct impact on public opinion, therefore, cannot be 
conducted. 
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To answer the research questions, we make use of a pooled cross-section time series 
multilevel model with Robust Maximum Likelihood estimates. Metric variables were centered 
around their grand mean.  
 
Results 
 
Relation between same-sex marriage legislation and tolerance of homosexuality 
The relationship between same-sex marriage legislation, registered partnership and 
tolerance of homosexuality is analysed with a sequence of multilevel models (Table 1). The 
base model includes both a fixed and random effect of survey year. Including these effects 
gives an indication of the overall trend in disapproval of homosexuality in Europe and 
whether this effect differs between countries. The fixed effect of survey year is -.02 (p<0.1): 
Overall, disapproval of homosexuality decreases between 2002 and 2010 in Europe, including 
various countries in Central and Eastern Europe. However, the significant, but small, random 
slopes effect of survey year reveals that not all participating countries have the same 
trajectory with regard to disapproval of homosexuality. In a final model we will test whether 
this variation in trajectories can be explained with country characteristics. The covariance 
between the slope and the intercepts is .009 (p<.01), meaning that countries with initially high 
levels of tolerance, decrease at a faster rate during the observed period than countries with 
lower levels of tolerance. The base model also indicates that 15.5% of the variance in 
disapproval of homosexuality can be attributed to differences between countries, and 84.5% 
of the variance to differences between individuals.  
In the second model we included some individual-level predictors. The predictors have 
effects in the expected direction: Male, older and lower educated respondents disapprove 
homosexuality more than female, younger and higher educated respondents. The effect of 
marital status is only marginal: divorced or widowed respondents are slightly more tolerant 
than respondents that were never married before. As expected, religion has a strong effect on 
disapproval of homosexuality. Except for Roman Catholics, respondents belonging to any 
religious denomination have higher levels of disapproval compared to non-religious 
respondents. Especially the strong effect of being Muslim is remarkable. Furthermore, 
religiousness and religious practice both have a strong positive relation with disapproval of 
homosexuality. Almost 13% of the individual residual variance can be explained with these 
predictors. 
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In a subsequent model, country-level predictors were added. Because the correlation 
between ‘years of stable democracy since 1919’ and ‘GDP per capita’ was very high (r=.81) it 
was impossible to include both controls into the same model. Therefore, we constructed two 
different models (model with GDP per capita in Appendix 2). Controlling for democratic 
stability and religious tradition, the level of same-sex marriage recognition has a strong effect 
on disapproval of homosexuality. Respondents in countries with registered partnership or 
same-sex marriage legislation tolerate homosexuality more than respondents in countries 
without legislation. Also, respondents in countries with same-sex marriage are more tolerant 
than respondents in countries with only a registered partnership procedure (this specific 
significance test is not shown in Table 1). Further, the higher the number of years with stable 
democracy and the higher the GDP per capita, the less disapproving of homosexuality a 
population is. The effect of the dominant religious tradition of a country is limited if we 
control for other country characteristics.
4
 If we control for democratic stability, we can 
observe that Roman Catholic and Mixed Christian countries are only slightly less 
disapproving than Eastern Orthodox countries (see Table 1). When we control for GDP per 
capita, the effect of religion even fully disappears (see Appendix 2). Almost all country-level 
variance is explained with these predictors, indicating that most relevant variables were 
included in the model.  
In a last model, we included the cross-level interaction between survey year and same-sex 
marriage legislation. The goal of this interaction was to test whether the trend in tolerance of 
homosexuality differed between countries with same-sex marriage legislation, registered 
partnership or countries without any legal form of legal recognition. As the non-significant 
coefficients and the fit indices show, the differences in trajectories cannot be explained by the 
level of legislation. The cross-level interaction between number of years of stable democracy 
and survey year was negative and small, but significant (p<.1; not shown in Table), indicating 
that countries with a long democratic tradition have a steeper decline in levels of disapproval 
than countries with a shorter democratic tradition. Other cross-level interactions were not 
significant.  
 
[Table 1 around here] 
 
Country-specific processes in the recognition of same-sex marriage legislation 
The adoption of same-sex partnership in Western Europe is partly characterized by policy 
convergence influenced by transnational LGBT networks (Kollman, 2007). Kollman argues 
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that transnational networks of elites and activists have influenced domestic policies in 
approving some form of same-sex partnership. However, the author also recognizes that there 
is still some cross-national dissimilarity in which kind of same-sex unions are approved: some 
countries recognize same-sex marriage, others only registered partnership. According to 
Kollman this can be explained by domestic factors as national religious practice and the 
perceived legitimacy of international norms. While we might hypothesize that other European 
countries will follow in recognizing same-sex marriage and same-sex partnership because of 
these transnational influences, the specific situation in each country will still play an 
important role. 
The Netherlands was the first country in the world to offer marriage to same-sex couples in 
2000. Opinion research shows that already from the 1960s public opinion in the Netherlands 
became much more tolerant toward homosexuality (Jaspers et al., 2007). The Christian-
Democratic party is traditionally a major coalition partner in the Netherlands, and this party 
was certainly not favorable to a recognition of same-sex marriage. When in 1994, for the very 
first time in decades, a coalition government was formed without Christian-Democrats, the 
secular parties took the opportunity to introduce same-sex marriages (Badgett, 2004). A 
similar reasoning goes for neighboring Belgium, where public opinion also shifted already 
quite early, but where only from 1999 on governments could be formed without religious 
parties. Here, the secular parties followed the example of the Netherlands, and by 2003 the 
law was adopted. In Spain too, a similar political logic was followed: In 2004, a Socialist 
government took office, after eight years of conservative majorities. Newly-elected Prime 
Minister Zapatero saw it as an act of modernization to legalize same-sex marriages, despite 
the opposition from the still powerful Catholic Church in Spain (Calvo, 2010). Norway 
(2008), Sweden (2009) and Denmark (2012) are Scandinavian countries that typically have a 
very tolerant attitude toward sexual minorities, and they have pioneered the recognition of 
same-sex partnership already in the 1990s. Both within the LGBT movement, as within the 
population as a whole this created the impression that the problem was ‘solved’, so there was 
no urgent need for a full recognition of same-sex marriage. Only years after the example of 
the Netherlands, therefore, the Scandinavian countries introduced similar legislation 
(Andersson et al., 2006). Portugal, finally, also adopted same-sex marriage in 2010 despite the 
fact that opinion polls do not show a very favorable public opinion. The new Socialist 
government, however, took the opportunity to demonstrate that Portugal indeed could adopt 
‘modern’ legislation. 
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Although there are only a few cases available, this short country-by-country overview 
shows that we can indeed witness a complicated interplay between a number of factors. In the 
Northern countries of Europe, one can indeed observe that a tolerant public opinion seems to 
be a factor in adopting same-sex marriage legislation. The role of the political system, 
however, cannot be neglected either. Left-wing governments taking office show a tendency to 
promote same-sex legislation, following a period of conservative governments. Finally, 
transnational examples also seem to play a role, most obviously in the case of Belgium 
following the Netherlands, and Portugal following Spain. 
 
 [Figure 2 around here] 
 
Discussion 
 
(…) 
 
The strong relation between public attitudes and legislation suggests that same-sex 
marriage is not just an elite phenomenon, that can be explained by processes that occur within 
the political decision-making structures, without too much involvement of public opinion. The 
general line is that same-sex marriage (or registered partnership) is recognized in countries 
where public opinion is indeed more tolerant. Nevertheless, it is clear from the country-
specific evidence that characteristics of the political elite also play a role. In the Netherlands, 
Belgium, Spain and Portugal one could observe the phenomenon that left-wing or secular 
political parties promised to open up marriage for same-sex couples, and subsequently 
implemented this promise once they came into office. A very preliminary conclusion 
therefore could be that while a tolerant population creates the opportunity to introduce same-
sex marriage, political elite actors still have to be convinced to use this opportunity.  
 
For the time being, the data do not allow us any statement about causality as this obviously 
would require more observations and longer periods of time. It is striking to note, however, 
that we do not find even the slightest indication for a backlash that could occur as a result of 
the legal recognition of same-sex marriage, as some more conservative authors have claimed 
(Badgett, 2004; Jacobi, 2006). The decline in disapproval of homosexuality seems to follow a 
gradual course in Western European countries and there is no indication for any abrupt 
changes, as a result of political debates or decisions. Although the number of observations is 
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too limited to revive the traditional debate on the questions whether ‘stateways can change 
folkways’, the available data rather suggest a self-reinforcement process. Obviously, the 
recognition of same-sex marriage does reflect a structural social characteristic and it is very 
likely to occur in countries with a liberal public opinion. We know that in the US in 1972 
74.3% of the respondents condemned homosexual relations as wrong and that this percentage 
decreased to 58% in 1998 (Treas, 2002). This would allow us to predict that if US 
government would adequately reflect public opinion, without any major distortions or the 
presence of veto players, the US most likely would recognize same-sex marriage. In a 
subsequent phase, however, we do observe that in countries that have recognized same-sex 
marriage, the decline of disapproval simply continues. Public opinion clearly does not oppose 
any legislation in this regard. During the past decades, attitudes toward homosexuality have 
changed dramatically in Western societies. Recognition of same-sex marriage is to be 
understood not just as a consequence of this societal process, but also as part of it. 
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Endnotes 
 
1
. The results of the multilevel model are similar if we included Israel and Turkey in the sample.  
2
. Number of participating countries in ESS for each round: 
2002: 22 countries; 2004: 25 countries; 2006: 23 countries; 2008: 27 countries; 2010: 26 countries.  
4
. We also controlled for the importance of religion at the aggregate country-level, but the effect was 
not significant.   
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Figure 1. Trend in disapproval of homosexuality of countries included in all five waves of the ESS  
 
Note. To calculate the mean both the design weight and the population weight were applied. 95% confidence intervals 
are added to the weighted means. T-tests indicate significant differences in disapproval of homosexuality between 
2004-2006, 2006-2008 and 2008-2010. Countries included in all five waves: Belgium, Switzerland, Germany, 
Denmark, Spain, Finland, UK, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Sweden, Slovenia, France. 
N=151,244. Source: ESS 2002-2010
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Figure 2. Trends in disapproval for countries with same-sex marriage legislation 
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Norway (2008) 
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Note. Country (year same-sex marriage legislation passed). Source: ESS 2002-2010
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Sweden (2009) 
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Portugal (2010) 
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Denmark (2012) 
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Table 1. Disapproval of homosexuality in 29 European countries 
 Base model 
+individual 
predictors 
+country 
level 
predictors 
+cross-level 
interaction 
term 
Fixed part B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) 
Survey year -.02 (.01)* -.02 (.01)* -.02 (.01)* .00 (.03) 
Gender (ref. male)  -.23 (.02)*** -.23 (.02)*** -.23 (.02)*** 
Age  .01 (.00)*** .01 (.00)*** .01 (.00)*** 
Education  -.09 (.01)*** -.09 (.01)*** -.09 (.01)*** 
Marital status  
(ref. Never married) 
    
Married/Cohabiting  -.00 (.01) -.00 (.01) -.00 (.01) 
Divorced/Widowed  -.03 (.01)* -.03 (.01)* -.03 (.01)* 
Religion (ref. Not religious)     
Roman Catholic  .01 (.02) .01 (.02) .01 (.02) 
Protestant  .05 (.03)* .05 (.03)* .05 (.03)* 
Eastern Orthodox  .12 (.06)* .13 (.06)* .13 (.06)* 
Muslim  .64 (.07)*** .64 (.07)*** .64 (.07)*** 
Other  .26 (.04)*** .26 (.04)*** .26 (.04)*** 
Religiousness  .03 (.00)*** .03 (.00)*** .03 (.00)*** 
Religious practice  .10 (.01)*** .10 (.01)*** .10 (.01)*** 
Legislation  
(ref. No legislation) 
    
Registered partnership   -.14 (.07)* -.16 (.07)* 
Same-sex marriage   -.41 (.09)*** -.44 (.09)*** 
Years of stable democracy 
since 1919 
  -.01 (.00)*** -.01 (.00)*** 
Dominant religious tradition  
(ref. Eastern Orthodox)  
    
Roman Catholic   -.25 (.13)* -.26 (.13)* 
Mixed Christian   -.26 (.14)* -.26 (.14)* 
Protestant   .04 (.15) .03 (.15) 
Survey year*registered 
partnership 
   -.03 (.03) 
Survey year*same-sex 
marriage 
   -.04 (.04) 
Random part     
Intercept 2.35 (.09)*** 2.66 (.08)*** 2.93 (.12)*** 2.95 (.12)*** 
Survey year slope .004 (.002)* .004 (.003) .004 (.002)* .004 (.002) 
Within level variance 1.20 (.06)*** 1.06 (.06)*** 1.06 (.06)*** 1.06 (.06)*** 
Between level variance .22 (.04)*** .20 (.05)*** .02 (.00)*** .02 (.00)*** 
Fit     
AIC 644451 563997 563944 563946 
BIC 644513 564181 564188 564211 
Note. Entries are unstandardized robust maximum likelihood estimates corrected for selection bias (design 
weight). N=194,710. Source: ESS 2002-2010.  
*p<0.1; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 
